

world hunger must not garner any more attention than is necessary to avoid explosions or trouble that could compromise the primary goal." Yet, he concluded, perhaps he was too harsh. "And perhaps, the bright, gleaming first world could not, beyond all human solidarity, remain insensitive to the slow, irresistibly humble and ferocious, movement toward life. Because an ignored, exploited and scorned Third World wants, like the Third Estate, to be something."¹²⁸ The desire for change had inspired a revolution in 1789, and it would do so again. The West needed to be prepared to ensure that the coming revolutions would end up transforming the world into its own image, rather than the Soviet's. Danger lurked in desire.

5

THE ETHIOPIAN EXPERIMENT

In a 1951 article, Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) Director Dr. Henry Garland Bennett wrote of Point Four that "some Americans are attracted by the humanitarian element" whereas others see in it "a unique opportunity to expand international trade," thereby missing the program's most innovative and critical point: creating national security through international progress. The "progress" began at home, with a new type of diplomacy that emphasized democracy from the bottom up. Point Four focused on one-on-one relationships, on "people working with people." This is "diplomacy in a new dimension," Bennett explained, a dimension in which American doctors and engineers "ply their trades" alongside the economists and professional diplomats traditionally responsible for building and maintaining foreign relationships. "If Point Four continues to develop and expand in the direction it has taken in its first year," he ended, "it may create better patterns of co-operation and, in time, a new art of human relations in the service of economic and social progress."¹ He believed that democratic systems of development would inspire local people to want democratic systems of government. He was right, but wanting and achieving were two different things, and, sometimes, the very aid programs that encouraged people to want political reform helped keep them from getting it.

Such things were not publically discussed, but American policymakers were aware from the very beginning that their plans to enhance standards of living, halt the spread of communism, expand the global economy, and encourage the spread of democracy were often not compatible. In such cases, it was the democracy that was the most easily forgotten and the people on the ground the most easily forsaken. In the Horn of Africa, it started with Eritrea.

The State Department's spring of 1951 policy statement on Ethiopia revealed the administration's willingness to give up part of its development plans to secure others. The report opened with

an acknowledgment that the 1950 U.N. resolution providing that "Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown," should make it "considerably easier in the future to reach amicable understandings with Ethiopia in regard to other matters." Denying Eritrean independence seemed a small price to pay for securing the emperor's beneficence. Sending him weapons did as well. Ethiopia "has strongly supported the United Nations war in Korea," with contributions of money for medical supplies and a contingent of more than 1,000 officers for service, the State Department reported, and its use "is highly desirable politically." Participation in the U.N. struggle would "help the Ethiopians to obtain United States arms and military equipment which, by mitigating their previous disappointments, should assist the United States in negotiations with Ethiopia for the continued use of certain military facilities in Eritrea." In addition, "including among the UN armed forces a contingent of troops from an independent, colored nation in Africa" would be of "great propaganda value" and "help to offset the Soviet claim that the Korean war is white imperialist aggression against the colored races of the world."² The same could be said of economic development, if the United States could manage do it.

The State Department insisted that it was in America's best interest "to encourage and assist Ethiopia to achieve a sound, balanced and orderly development of its economic potentialities through development of its natural resources, improvement of the methods and means of agricultural and industrial production, and expansion of multilateral trade." Options already existed. The 1944 Fellows Mission had created a ten-year plan for development, the report acknowledged, which was "too ambitious for the Ethiopians to undertake in its entirety," but "selected projects in the plan . . . are worthy of consideration by this Government." Addis Ababa "has shown a preference for American advisors" and the groundwork has already been laid for the implementation of a successful assistance program. "The Point IV Program, if adequately administered, should increase the cordiality of the US-Ethiopian friendship." In the end, the report concluded, our policy toward Ethiopia "must reflect the problem which Ethiopia itself presents." It is a weak nation in an internationally critical area, and we cannot afford to allow it to fall to communist pressures—from without or from within.³

Largely unbeknownst to policymakers in early 1951, the "problem" of Ethiopia proved to be the question of reconciling economic development with political stagnation. Haile Selassie had not worked his entire life to become the most powerful emperor in Ethiopian history to give it up in

return for some American aid. He had bigger plans. Truman's program was created to pursue multiple objectives and Washington was not averse to denying Ethiopians liberty in the name of American safety. The U.S. government had bigger plans as well.

On March 15, 1950, Haile Selassie held an audience with George C. McGhee, the assistant secretary for African affairs, during which the emperor first thanked the United States for its assistance with the "Eritrean question" and then went on to make a case for granting Ethiopia "assistance under Point Four of the Truman Programme." Ethiopia, the Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs reported the emperor as saying, "stands in need of greatly increasing her means of production and of transportation and, certainly, in this respect, the United States is in the best position for aiding in this development, by experts and capital."⁴ Haile Selassie insisted that Ethiopia not only required assistance, but that it was in an ideal position to receive aid, because most of its exports went to the United States; it had allowed the Sinclair Petroleum Company "complete freedom and tranquility" to go about its activities in the country; Ethiopian Airlines was under American administration; and, crucially, American experts had already established a systematic plan for Ethiopia's economic development. The American government "has never failed to demonstrate its friendly attitude towards Ethiopia," and Point Four offered the perfect opportunity to do so again.⁵

Opportunity became reality when Truman signed Point Four into existence that June. Before the year was up, the same Perry Fellows who had led the original 1944 American technical mission to Ethiopia submitted to the TCA a forty-page Point Four proposal he had created on behalf of the Imperial Ethiopian Government (IEG), which had appointed him director of planning. After all, it could not hurt to have an American pleading their case to the United States. Fellows structured the proposal as a three-part plan divided into (1) a program for educating Ethiopian students in Near East colleges currently run or assisted by America; (2) a program of "special operations" to be undertaken by U.S. government agencies; and (3) a three-year program of projects to be undertaken by the IEG. The first program was designed for about one hundred students, a number that reflected both the scarcity of qualified students and the additional absorption capabilities of the colleges themselves, and would cost the United States about \$150,000 (all sums in U.S. dollars) and Ethiopia about \$50,000 for the first year. The second program was to consist of three projects: an agricultural experiment station run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture at a cost of \$425,000 over three years; a vaguely titled "Educational Activity" run by the U.S. Office of

Education at a cost of \$430,000 over three years; and a hydroelectric power project at Lake Tana run by the U.S. Department of the Interior at a cost of \$280,000 over three years. The three programs required a Point Four appropriation of \$1,135,000, with the expectation that the IEG would cover "the costs incurred in Ethiopia," including those for land, labor, and housing, which were estimated to total around \$210,000 for all three programs for all three years.⁶

Fellows dedicated by far the vast majority of the proposal to the third section where he elucidated projects that would be run by the IEG, but funded by a combination of Point Four and IEG funding, with Point Four support estimated at \$3,000,000 and IEG's "slightly higher." These programs would not be allowed to have any foreigner in the "line of command," but would have U.S. technicians employed in an advisory capacity. "In view of the demands of the World situation on American technical personnel," Fellows wrote, "preference will be given projects making minimum demands for such personnel or for strategic materials," additionally bearing in mind that preference also had to go to projects that will "promote Ethiopian health, education, industry and commerce."⁷ He broke down projects in this third section according to IEG ministries, with agriculture working on poultry development and "bee culture," education on building libraries and laboratories, public health on establishing a domestic pharmaceutical supply, and interior working on the "standardization of names," to name a few.⁸

With its primary emphasis on education, small-scale agricultural technology, and infrastructure, the IEG proposal demonstrated a keen awareness of the international conversation about development. Fellows described Ethiopian "poverty" in the strict statistical terms now sanctioned by the international community. "The average income per head in the U.S.A. has been estimated at \$1,400 by the Statistical Office of the United Nations," he reported, "and the average income in Ethiopia is *much less* [his emphasis] than \$100 per head, probably about \$30. The objective of the Point Four program is to close this [\$1,370] gap." Proposed solutions repeated ideas present in the United Nations's 1951 *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries*, particularly its emphasis on a Western scientific education. Select Ethiopians would travel abroad to study and then return with the knowledge necessary both to implement new technologies and to teach others to do the same. Foreign donations could also fund new laboratories and libraries to further democratize education. "The knowledge the students get" from visiting such institutions, Fellows insisted, "is a development of Ethiopia's greatest resource and this will, in turn, lead to more rapid

development of all the others." The authors of the U.N. report had written that a "scientific attitude" is "one of the preconditions of progress" and Fellows knew that U.S. readers of his proposal would be looking for programs that demonstrated an awareness of the value of human capital.⁹ Such capital had to be developed into scientific literacy; it also had to be organized by the state in new ways—as demonstrated in the proposed project to work on "the standardization of names."

Twentieth-century nation states were entrusted with the responsibility of enhancing their citizens' well-being, which was difficult to do in a nation full of politically invisible people. Greater knowledge of the populace enabled the state to provide for the people's welfare in a more meaningful way. It also enabled the state to control people in a more dangerous way. Haile Selassie viewed modernization and centralization as intimately connected goals. Although seemingly unnoticed by recipient U.S. officials, and probably Fellows himself, the potential tensions between development and tyranny in Ethiopia lay innocently next to one another in the proposal.

Fellows took great care analyzing the feasibility and potential costs of each proposed project and essentially handed the TCA almost everything it needed for a three-year Point Four program in Ethiopia. The only thing he did not consider was the TCA preference of formulating its own plans. Point Four was certainly a joint effort, but countries, as Ethiopia soon learned, could not simply order money and technicians from America. Getting Point Four assistance meant accepting Point Four personnel in the "line of command" and, usually, at the very top. Additionally, activity had to wait for the creation and acceptance of specific agreements. Point Four came one project at a time.

Although Fellows's proposal on behalf of the IEG received some attention in Washington in the winter of 1950/51, it did not become the foundation of an active Point Four program.¹⁰ Ethiopia had to wait until June to get its initial agreement and until May of 1952 for actual Point Four projects to begin. In the interim, the United States worked to ensure that the IEG received funds from the United Nations, the Import-Export Bank, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to assist in livestock inoculations, road construction, telecommunications development, and the establishment of the Ethiopian Development Bank.¹¹ Haile Selassie needed the money, because it was virtually impossible to run a development program for a country as large and as populous as Ethiopia on a budget, one U.S. administrator later remarked in a letter to Fellows, "only approximately as large as the school budget for the metropolitan area of Washington, DC."¹² The

delay stemmed from bureaucracy, not hesitation. There was no doubt that Ethiopia—"poor," "strategic," and "loyal"—qualified.

Ethiopia, the 1952 TCA's preparatory evaluation of the country noted, "is almost completely underdeveloped. The rate of illiteracy is extremely high and health and sanitation conditions are very primitive." In addition, it "is strategically located . . . on the defense perimeter of the Middle East, and possesses favorable climatic and topographical conditions, for defensive and offensive purposes." Admitting that "Communist activities have made little progress in the country so far," TCA analysts warned that "there are indications it may soon become a prime target of Communist infiltration." Ethiopia was poor, geographically strategic, and potentially vulnerable to communist incursion, which meant that it met all of the basic requirements for Point Four. Once it was clear that Ethiopia was going to get aid, discussion began about how that aid would be distributed. From the perspective of national security, the central point was just to provide enough aid to keep Ethiopia friendly with the United States and distant with the USSR, but aid carried economic expectations as well. The TCA analysts believed that "the fertile lands of Ethiopia probably are potentially the most productive of any presently underdeveloped agricultural areas in the World," and its geographic location means that it could potentially become a major food supplier for the Middle East. Ethiopia's agricultural development will be of great significance to Ethiopia's economy and "to the World food supply."

However much the IEG might desire balanced rural and urban development, U.S. aid was first going to go to the countryside. The chief of the TCA mission to Ethiopia later wrote to Perry Fellows, "the factors which I would take into account establishing priorities for projects . . . would not necessarily be the same factors which the Ethiopian Government would take into account in determining priorities for its total program of economic development. At least the order of importance might change." In 1952, the TCA ranking began with agriculture, and then listed health, education, government administration and service, transportation and communication, and natural resource development (the nation's lack of oil had become apparent), before ending with industry. The plan was to develop Ethiopia into the breadbasket of the Middle East, not into a clone of the industrial West.¹³

The possibility of Ethiopia's successful development depended on the government's support—despite that government's questionable structure. "Ethiopia is nominally a constitutional monarchy," TCA analysts admitted, "although the Emperor continues to exercise virtually absolute powers." He, "however, is progressive and has the social and economic welfare of his people

at heart." He is "intensely interested" in improving living standards. Additionally, they continued, the emperor had shown himself to be "strongly oriented toward the United States and the rest of the democratic world" by taking part in the U.N. action in Korea. As Haile Selassie held up the strategic side of the bargain, so the United States needed to do its part to bring technology and capital into his economy. In 1952, Point Four aid to Ethiopia called for a modest \$1,000,000 and about fifty American technicians. If it could do what it promised, it was a foreign policy steal.¹⁴ It was not a bad deal for Haile Selassie, either; even though Point Four did not always offer the kinds of development that he wanted when he wanted it, it was a lot more than nothing.

Things got started on May 15, 1952, when the two countries signed an agreement to begin construction on the Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts. Oklahoma A&M volunteered to partner with the IEG in formulating plans for classroom learning and countrywide extension services. The project, the TCA reported, "is aimed directly at building up Ethiopia's major potential contribution to the economic strength of the free nations of the world," in the hope that the more than 80 percent of its population engaged in agriculture would be able to vastly improve their production in order to provide "foodstuffs to the food-short countries in the Middle and Near East."¹⁵ The emphasis upon agricultural education combined two essential fields of development and seemed an ideal opening project. The U.S. Government and the IEG both contributed \$400,000. In addition, with assistance from Oklahoma A&M, the U.S. provided nine administrators to fill the leadership roles in the college and Ethiopia provided a liaison officer and fifteen "trainees," and, importantly, the land in Harar on which it was to be built. Because starting the nation's agricultural development was too important to be left waiting until the facilities could be built, the next month they signed a new agreement to begin holding classes at a school in Jimma starting that fall. The Jimma Agricultural Technical School demanded additional U.S. technicians to teach classes to about a hundred students, and another \$200,000 to fund it for the year. Extension projects also began right away, sending U.S. technicians out into the countryside to demonstrate "modern" farming techniques to a wider audience.¹⁶

Even though agriculture remained the primary focus of the U.S. mission, education and public health concerns also warranted a great deal of attention. Officials with the TCA estimated that less than 5 percent of the population was literate, which would, they worried, prove "one of the most serious obstacles to the introduction of modern techniques and equipment" in their

efforts to improve agricultural productivity and raise living standards.¹⁷ The problem was so vast it was difficult to think of feasible ways to combat it. In June, the United States and the IEG signed an agreement for a Cooperative Education Program for the express purpose of assisting "the Ministry of Education in developing a modern educational program and school system adapted to the needs of Ethiopia." The project agreement was quite distinct from other (both previous and later) agreements, in that it contained within it seventeen different goals/miniprojects, varying from simply increasing the number of teachers to training them in "modern" techniques and providing them with books and equipment. Whereas the plans were large, the input was modest. The United States provided only about \$100,000 and seventeen technicians/advisors/teachers. Ethiopia did the same.¹⁸

Additional projects for 1952 included sending a handicraft specialist and a modest amount of funding to assist in the work of Her Imperial Majesty's Handicraft School, which trained craftsmen in making furniture, clothing, jewelry, and other products; implementing a water resource study; and establishing a Pest Control Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture. The latter involved a U.S. contribution of three American sprayer planes, the necessary chemicals, an entomologist, and three pilots on loan from the regional locust program office. In return, Ethiopia donated the fuel and sent eleven men to be trained in the technology involved in the process. The water resource study included both examining the country's potential for hydroelectric power and researching irrigation feasibility schemes. It required nine U.S. scientists and around \$60,000, combined with forty Ethiopian trainees and a matching dollar contribution.¹⁹ All three of these projects, along with the ones discussed previously, continued to be funded (at varying levels) for at least another two years, but in the opening days of 1953, Point Four's future was uncertain.

On January 12, 1953, the *New York Times* ran a lengthy article publishing the very favorable findings of an investigation it had made into Point Four operations in all of the thirty-five countries that had official agreements.²⁰ Truman had arranged the article as part of a publicity campaign strategy to save Point Four from the new president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who more than once during the campaign had announced that the United States "cannot go on forever being Santa Claus to the world."²¹ Concerned about the program's efficiency, Eisenhower sent Eric Johnston of the International Development Advisory Board overseas that spring to investigate operations in Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Ethiopia. He liked what he saw.

In the opening of his report on his trip, Johnston told the president that "the technical cooperation program is well received; a good U.S. investment in friendship and goodwill; effective in helping others acquire knowledge and skills useful in their social and economic development; relatively inexpensive and well worth the time and expense in terms of world peace and development." Writing particularly about Ethiopia, Johnston noted that he had met with many officials, the most important being Haile Selassie and Yilma Deressa, who was now the minister of commerce and industry. Both "seemed pleased with the Point 4 program and its personnel." The British ambassador showed decidedly less enthusiasm, telling Johnston "in the strongest possible terms the danger of proceeding too far and too fast with the Point 4 program." The Ethiopians, he insisted, are "inclined to play one group of foreigners against another to keep them in balance," and the influx of American personnel is making their game easier. When asked, the Ethiopians strongly disagreed, no doubt helpfully pointing out that the British were concerned about their own agenda. Yilma Deressa insisted that his country needed more, not less U.S. involvement. Johnston agreed.²²

Despite initial misgivings, Eisenhower acknowledged that Point Four seemed to be both popular and effective. Though willing to maintain Truman's program, however, the new president severed the program's overt ties with the previous administration. In July 1953, Point Four and the TCA became the Foreign Operations Administration and then, in 1955, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), which is the name that will be used henceforth to avoid unnecessary confusion. The changes took Point Four out of the Department of State and into its own agency. The move showed the increasing value that the Eisenhower administration placed on foreign aid, but did little to change the program's essential nature. The term *Point Four* managed to show up frequently in letters and documents throughout the 1950s. People continued to associate foreign aid with Truman, but Eisenhower worked to put his own stamp on it. In 1954, he signed the strategic Food-for-Peace Program (Public Law 480) into creation, which allowed the United States to donate domestic agricultural surpluses to countries that needed food. In 1957, he created the Development Loan Fund within the ICA to support development projects not considered standard technical assistance. Foreign aid funding actually rose a great deal under the man who had once worried about being "Santa Claus to the world."²³

With the exception of its name, Point Four remained largely unchanged. In 1953, ICA officials listed nine goals for the U.S. mission to Ethiopia: to improve agricultural production by "training in basic agricultural elements" and "raising the level of study to specialized fields of agriculture"; to explore the possibility of

increasing coffee and livestock production for export; to cooperate with the international locust control program; to "broaden the educational base by training teachers and educational administrators"; to explore feasible means of increasing water utilization; "to produce a corps of trained personnel to bring health services to the local communities"; to encourage more effective marketing of products; "to develop a body of trained government personnel"; and "to assist in the organization of institutions and government mechanisms through which trained Ethiopians can accomplish the principles outlined above."²⁴ The ICA attempted to meet these goals by increasing its staff, using more funds, and initiating more projects. By March 1953, Point Four had forty-five staff persons working in Ethiopia with six more on the way.²⁵ The funding allotment from Washington more than doubled to \$2,600,000. New projects, dedicated to cattle vaccination, well drilling, nurse and midwife training, and public health education, were initiated in 1953. These were joined in 1954 by projects focused on further agricultural improvement initiatives, cooperative coffee development-for-exportation schemes, water safety studies, and rural vocational development through the establishment of handicraft centers around the country.



FIGURE 5.1 A pith-helmeted Haile Selassie and other guests view a poultry demonstration during a 1955 Field Day at the Jimma Agricultural Technical School. *Still Picture Records Section, National Archives, College Park, Maryland*

Two additional 1954 projects inspired greater attention, namely, the Commerce and Industry Development Service and the Public Administration projects. Both shared a common goal of working with the Ethiopian government to alter, to varying degrees, its governmental/legal structure. The Commerce and Industry Development Service focused primarily on helping the IEG to create an "attractive investment climate" for both domestic and international businessmen. This was done by persuading the IEG to instigate measures such as tax exemption for five years, import duty exemption, and repatriation of investment and profits. Additional measures, including required participation of Ethiopian private capital jointly with foreign private capital, were also instigated to ensure that investment would be of the greatest benefit to the local market. By April 1954, there were fifty-three active private investments underway in Ethiopia, divided almost equally between foreign and domestic companies.²⁶ The U.S. efforts to assist the IEG in making this possible were founded on classic development discourse ideology, harkening back to Rosenstein-Rodan's initial call for substantial international investment in "international depressed areas," ideally by states, but supplemented by private capital whenever possible.²⁷ Point Four staffers knew that the ICA program was "very small in relation to Ethiopia's needs" and could not offer the kinds of capital necessary for sparking natural, continued development. Anyway, the program had always been designed simply to start nations on the road to progress, getting them to the point where they could enter the world economy in a meaningful way and rely on the power of the market for continued development. Technical assistance was the beginning, not the end of development.²⁸

Thinking along these lines, U.S. Operations Mission Director Marcus Gordon urged Perry Fellows to divert more IEG funds toward coffee development, which is something that Haile Selassie had been promoting since the 1920s. "I would agree with you that there may be some danger in the long run of spending extensive amounts for the further development of a commodity upon which Ethiopia is already dependent," Gordon admitted, "however, the economic factors seem to indicate clearly that Ethiopia will benefit" from expenditures in this area. You have the best land in the world for coffee, he insisted, and coffee consumption is on the rise in the United States, in Europe, and even in Asia. Brazil dominates the market currently, but you can produce it and sell it for less, changing the stakes of the global market. "With relatively little effort Ethiopia's coffee production can be multiplied by several times" and you will see high returns on your investment right now and probably well into the future. Because the United States consumed roughly half of the

world's coffee production, challenging the Brazilian monopoly would also be beneficial at home, Gordon implied, but did not acknowledge directly.²⁹ Fellows was justly nervous about betting everything on coffee, because commodities are fickle things, but without industry, Ethiopia only had the products of its land and coffee was by far the most valuable of those products. The ICA was working on the ground to enhance the general agricultural yields of small farmers around the country, but coffee—primarily grown in the south on lands controlled by northern nobles, and already a pet project of the emperor—could be expanded more quickly and easily. You need money now, Gordon wrote, so put emergency money into the one crop that already has a presence on the world market. Haile Selassie, as will be demonstrated later in the chapter, could not have agreed more. He had always placed a great deal of hope in coffee.

While the Commerce and Industry Development Service worked on enhancing Ethiopia's attractiveness to private investors, the Public Administration project directed its efforts toward the more general goal of equipping the government bureaucracy to deal with the changing demands of an expanding economy and an expanding social services sector. "Both day to day administration and long range governmental planning in Ethiopia," Point Four officials noted, "are handicapped by the lack of effective and coordinated public administration," so efforts were undertaken to train Ethiopian officials in the effective administration of government.³⁰ This training included compiling records, archiving data, taking proper accounting of funds and coordinating work between different ministries. The Public Administration project also funded a couple of studies of specific ministries in order to appraise their organization and their administration. The U.S. administrators were, perhaps, anticipating a day when Ethiopia would no longer be run by an emperor with "virtually absolute powers" and trying to assist the country in establishing a bureaucracy that could run on its own. Haile Selassie, however, had no intention of allowing the United States to develop Ethiopia out of his control. Presidents come and go, but an emperor can reign for a century, or at least something close to it.

In June 1954, Haile Selassie visited Oklahoma A&M to thank the college for its assistance in establishing and maintaining Ethiopia's own A&M. At the formal banquet marking the event, the college presented the emperor with a scroll pronouncing "appreciation for his courageous and enlightened leadership of his people" and gratitude for the opportunity to "assist him in some measure in bringing to fruition the humanitarian and progressive dream he holds for his great nation and its people." Haile Selassie graciously

thanked the college and expressed his hope that his visit would "stimulate an even greater program of technical assistance and private capital investment" than the one currently in existence. "I have always been mindful of the importance of economic cooperation as one of the parts of understanding between nations," he continued, which is why Ethiopia encourages "persons of good intent to come and participate in the program which we have outlined for the progress and welfare of our people."³¹ By referring to the plan Perry Fellows had created during the 1940s, the emperor reminded his listeners that Ethiopia had created its own plan for its development years before Point Four aid first reached the country. Haile Selassie had been trying to modernize his nation since the 1920s and although he gladly welcomed U.S. assistance, he insisted on Ethiopian autonomy as much as possible. "We," he emphasized, "have outlined" a program, and we hope that you will "participate" in it. In his ideal modernization scheme, the money and the technicians came from abroad, but the ideas came from the palace.

Just a few days earlier, Haile Selassie had spoken (partly in English, partly in Amharic) to a joint session of Congress explaining "the circumstances which make Ethiopia a significant factor in world affairs." In the last seven years, he noted, Ethiopia's foreign trade, currency, and foreign exchange had quadrupled, and holdings of American dollars had increased ten times over due to coffee sales. Ethiopia became the only country in the Middle East to have a dollar-based currency, and the assets of its national bank of issue had increased 1,000 percent. Since the end of the war, he continued, picking up on a topic that he knew was dear to American leaders, Ethiopia "has become the granary of the Middle East, as well as the only exporter of meat, cereals and vegetables." The nation was seemingly fulfilling its side of the development bargain. Even though all its educational facilities were destroyed during the war, schools were now "springing up throughout the land." We have, he concluded, "become a land of expanding opportunities where the American pioneering spirit, ingenuity and technical abilities have been, and will continue to be, welcomed."³² Although he did not say it directly, the message announced that such progress would certainly continue if the aid continued. In less public venues around Washington, he did not display such confidence, expressing worry that Ethiopia's very existence—let alone its modernization—was at risk from threats at home and abroad. He needed more.

Haile Selassie had, one U.S. official at the Ethiopian embassy wrote in 1955, "an inordinate interest in military affairs."³³ While the emperor continued to plow money into economic development, his primary preoccupation proved to be expanding and modernizing his military forces. The United

States helped him do it. By the end of March 1954, Washington had shipped \$3.8 million worth of small arms, artillery, and small vehicles to Addis Ababa.³⁴ It was a start. "Last year by favoring Ethiopia over other countries of the Middle East," the Ethiopian embassy wrote in a 1954 memorandum to Eisenhower, "the United States enabled Ethiopia to lay the basis for a fruitful collaboration on the military plane." His Imperial Majesty believes it "absolutely essential that this program go forward as rapidly as possible," and Ethiopia is "happy" to agree to any desired escalation of the U.S. military presence in return for new equipment.³⁵ So 1954 became the first, but certainly not the last, year that American military aid to Ethiopia outstripped economic/technical aid. Washington's desire to maintain a strategic presence in the region blended well with the emperor's grand visions of being the leading political figure in both Africa and the Middle East. He possessed something that the United States wanted, and he worked very hard to make sure that it became dependent upon it.

Initial American military interest in Ethiopia centered on the Asmara Barracks radio communication center. Located far from the North and South poles, Asmara was in a tropic zone with very little seasonal variation between the time of sunrise and sunset, which had the beneficial effect of limiting the number of frequency changes necessary for continued radio contact. It was the perfect radio tracking center for monitoring the region, and the United States wanted it. Its location had ensured U.S. support for Ethiopia's petition to the United Nations for federation with Eritrea.³⁶ The federation became final in September 1952, and the following year, the United States formalized access to the recently dubbed Kagnew Station (in honor of the Ethiopian battalion that had served in Korea), in a twenty-five-year lease agreement at the cost of around \$10 million a year. The agreement also granted the United States complete freedom of access to all Ethiopian facilities and freedom of flight over the country. In return, along with continued Point Four assistance, Haile Selassie attained another agreement that required the United States to establish a Military Assistance Advisory Acceptance Group, which would train and equip three Ethiopian divisions of around 6,000 men each and an additional \$5,000,000 in military assistance.³⁷

By the time Haile Selassie made his first official state visit in May 1954, the agreements of the previous year had convinced him that his future relationship with the United States rested on a combination of economic and military assistance in return for his continued loyalty to the West. Changes in the U.S. perspective of the region in the mid-1950s proved to further strengthen his cause in Washington and resulted in millions more dollars

worth of aid and equipment to continue securing this strategic ally resting on the border between the Middle East and Africa. Haile Selassie himself had stressed the point during his speech to Congress. "Situated along the shores of the Red Sea, with the desert area of Africa to the north and west, it is but natural," he explained, "that Ethiopia should be the filter through which the ideas and influences of the Continent of Africa should pass to the East and vice versa."³⁸ That position had historically belonged to Egypt, but Egypt was proving troublesome to both Haile Selassie and, increasingly, the United States.

While the Eisenhower administration spent most of its time working to stop the spread of communism around the world, members of the IEG in Addis Ababa spent their time worrying about how they would maintain control over a state that contained hundreds of thousands of unwilling subjects. Newly federated Eritreans had hoped that they would get independence after the Italians were forced out, but instead wound up subordinate to Addis Ababa. Domestic resistance to Ethiopian rule led many to turn to Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser for support, and he promptly opened his door to Muslim (and also a few Christian) Eritrean expatriates. Nasser, Haile Selassie's premier rival for regional influence, was a source of great distress for the emperor, who feared that the Egyptian would (as, indeed, he did) promote Muslim dissatisfaction with his regime.³⁹ This posed a problem much greater than Eritrea itself, for the countryside outside of the highlands surrounding Addis Ababa was populated with ethnic and religious groups that felt little loyalty to the ruling Christian Amharas. In order to keep control, the IEG relied increasingly on dictatorial rule in the periphery.⁴⁰

In addition to struggling to keep the empire's unwilling participants *in*, Haile Selassie was also constantly working to keep other empires *out*. Although the British had evacuated most of the country by 1950, they kept troops stationed in a 25,000 square mile territory known as the Haud in the Ogaden, which shared a border with French and British Somaliland. The Haud was primarily populated by ethnic Muslim Somalis, who evidenced little desire to be united with Ethiopia, but Addis Ababa had an official claim to the region dating back to an 1897 treaty with Britain. Haile Selassie demanded that the territory be returned to him and it was in early 1955. The French and the British, however, remained just across the border, engaging in regular conversations about the benefits of an eventual "Greater Somaliland."⁴¹ Clearly the IEG had reason to worry about the stability of its power, particularly as it remained hazy what Washington policymakers, who were trying "to keep both colonizers and colonized together as part of the 'free

world," would do in the face of a European onslaught against his country.⁴² Haile Selassie challenged European authority in neighboring countries. For much of Africa—and, indeed, for the descendents of Africans around the world—Ethiopia and its ruler served as proof that white oppression could be effectively resisted.

A "modernized" Ethiopia would provide even greater legitimacy to Haile Selassie's status as Africa's leading figure and the emperor continued to pursue the economic development of his nation with great zeal in the midst of transforming its military. He decided in 1954, ten years after Perry Fellows's original technical mission, to embrace a new development scheme for Ethiopia. The emperor ordered surveys of the country's economic situation and set up a National Economic Council consisting of Ethiopia's ministers and vice-ministers of commerce and industry, agriculture, finance, defense, and public works, as well as "experts" from the University of Belgrade and various IEG departments. He was the chair. With his "guidance," he announced, the council would develop a new plan to help Ethiopia "achieve a modernization of her economy." Officials spent the next three years working out the details.⁴³ In the same spirit, he decided in 1955, in honor of the silver jubilee of his coronation, to grant his people a "Revised Constitution consolidating the progress achieved, and preparing the way for future advances." The past twenty-five years, he announced in a speech introducing the constitution, "have been characterized by material, including commercial, industrial and financial progress, a steeply ascending curve of cultural and political development, an expanded population and national territory, and ever-widening national horizons." We have accomplished much, but Ethiopia "under Our guidance, must consolidate this progress. She must do more. She must advance yet further." Progress demands "increasing governmental supervision and control," which the new constitution provides.⁴⁴ Although it introduced universal adult suffrage and provisions for a Chamber of Deputies elected by the people, the constitution as a whole did little more than reaffirm the emperor's absolute power. Article 4 announced he was "sacred" and his power "indisputable." It symbolized progress, but codified continued absolutism.⁴⁵ What the constitution did on paper, military modernization did in practice. Haile Selassie pursued development projects designed to make him untouchable. He had a lot of enemies. The one in Cairo was still considered a "friend" to the United States, but such things have a way of falling apart. He watched and waited.

The United States had been openly working with Nasser since the 1952 coup that brought his government to power, but the Egyptian leader's increasing resistance to Western intervention in his affairs and public hatred of

Israel was proving troublesome for Washington. By 1954, U.S. policymakers had two major concerns regarding Egypt. The first was to ensure continued Anglo influence over the Suez Canal by helping create an agreement that sanctioned the British presence in the Canal Zone. The second was to determine Egypt's role in future Middle East security. Convinced that they needed to build a northern tier of defense as a buffer against Soviet expansion into the region, U.S. officials began working with Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan to establish the Baghdad Pact. In order to further a more positive relationship with the Revolutionary Command Council and its now overt head, Nasser, the Eisenhower administration offered \$40 million in economic assistance. British interests once again delayed the delivery of the money until after Egypt had signed an evacuation agreement for the Canal Zone that included the right to reoccupy in the event of an attack by an outside force on any Arab League state or on Turkey, but by the end of summer negotiations ensued between Washington and Cairo.⁴⁶ Nasser signed the economic aid agreement in November, but, much to Washington's consternation, he refused any military aid, because he did not want the conditions that came with it. Also, despite the economic aid, he refused to join the Baghdad Pact and even began campaigning to get other Middle Eastern nations to follow his example. In 1955, he solidified his commitment to neutrality by attending the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, which unnerved the Eisenhower administration with its efforts to bring racial and imperial issues to the forefront of international relations, thereby taking the focus off of the East versus West fight. A few months later, he purchased large quantities of arms through Czechoslovakia.⁴⁷

Relations between Washington and Cairo steadily deteriorated throughout 1954 and 1955, even though U.S. policymakers continued sending large amounts of Point Four aid in attempts to keep Nasser friendly to their interests.⁴⁸ Between the original agreement in 1951 and July 1954, the United States contributed \$16,589,427 to Point Four programs in Egypt. In 1955, the United States distributed an additional \$3,444,000 to the U.S. mission to Egypt. Along with this technical assistance, Washington provided a further \$40 million in development funding between 1954 and 1955, of which the majority (\$27 million) went to improving the nation's transportation system.⁴⁹ By the end of fiscal year (FY) 1955, Egypt had received almost \$60 million in foreign aid from the United States. The next year, everything changed.

In 1956, frustrated over America's abrupt withdrawal of a loan offer to construct the Aswan Dam in response to his attacks on Israel, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, announcing that its revenue would be used to pay for

the dam. When Britain, France, and Israel subsequently attacked Egypt, the United States demanded that they cease hostilities, but the United States–Egyptian relationship was seriously damaged by the whole incident. The hostilities, combined with Nasser's continued reluctance to acknowledge U.S. aid publicly, led the Eisenhower administration to call a halt to Point Four activities in the country.⁵⁰

At this critical juncture, Haile Selassie once more displayed a shrewd ability to anticipate Washington's desires by permitting Israel to open a permanent consulate in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia had been a subtle supporter of the Jewish state since its inception, but had resisted a public relationship for fear of damaging its influence over its Middle Eastern neighbors. As America's relationship with Nasser went from bad to nonexistent, Haile Selassie recognized that the moment was ripe for him to secure greater concessions for his own loyalty to Washington's Middle East agenda.⁵¹ His plan worked. In a November 1956 National Security Council (NSC) meeting, Eisenhower "stated very firmly his great anxiety to be assured of the friendship of Ethiopia."⁵² An NSC policy paper released a few days later asserted, "Ethiopia's importance to the United States transcends the country's limited power and somewhat isolated position. Current developments in the Near East increase the value to the United States of a friendly, stable government in this region of Africa." Ethiopian support is also ideologically important, for, "from a political point of view, it is of value to maintain close relations with an African state which has become a symbol of resistance to aggression and a champion of collective security."⁵³ Sending troops to Korea had been one of Haile Selassie's wisest moves. Opening his doors to Israel would prove to be another.

In the midst of consolidating his authority at home, the emperor also validated such consolidation abroad, convincing policymakers in the United States that he was far too loyal a friend to risk damaging in the pursuit of spreading democracy. "The political stability of Ethiopia, its present pro-Western orientation and its still apparent freedom from communist subversion, is at present almost solely dependent upon the prestige and power of His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I," read an Operations Coordinating Board report in December 1956. He is under siege by a number of groups: "dispossessed political leaders," "progressive young army officers," "tribal leaders and provincial lords whose traditional power is threatened by the growing power of the central government," the "Moslems group which constitutes a strong minority of the population," "young intellectuals and middle and upper class civil servants who are dissatisfied with their present status," the "Communist

Bloc," and Egypt. We have "an unquestioned interest" in "offsetting" the "latent threats to Ethiopia's security and independence from communist and Egyptian tactics," maintaining political stability, and "developing" it "along Western standards," the report continued. By the end of 1956, the U.S. government viewed the IEG as a central player in its international security agenda.⁵⁴ Increased attention brought increased aid. Through 1956, U.S. military and economic aid to Ethiopia totaled a little more than \$24 million, but the budget for 1957 quickly shot up to \$13.6 million for one year alone, including a \$5 million grant aid to be used at the IEG's discretion.⁵⁵ It also brought visible American attention.

"Important steps have been taken to strengthen Ethiopia's alignment with the U.S.," insisted a 1957 progress report on U.S. policy. The nation "was included within the area covered by the American Doctrine, and was recently visited by Vice President Nixon and other high-ranking United States officials."⁵⁶ In the now famously dubbed Eisenhower Doctrine, following on the heels of the Suez Crisis, the president proposed legislation to "authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence" and to "authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid." The United States had already been doing as much through programs associated with the mutual security programs, but Eisenhower informed Congress that he was going to be asking for an additional \$200,000,000 for "discretionary use in the area" during both FY 1958 and 1959. Lest there be any doubt about the U.S. commitment to the region, he also asked that the president be given the authority to employ the armed forces in order to protect any state in the region under the threat of "overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism." Congress granted him the authority by the end of the month.⁵⁷ Eisenhower promptly sent Special Ambassador James P. Richards to the Middle East to generate support for the doctrine. Ethiopia and the Sudan were included because, in the words of a 1957 NSC report, "these countries tend in their political, cultural and economic outlooks to be oriented much more towards North Africa and the Middle East . . . than they are towards tropical Africa." They are additionally united by their concerns about "Egypt's ambitions in the area," and "direct their attentions and energies northwards."⁵⁸ Haile Selassie certainly would have agreed that he spent a lot of time worrying about Egypt, but his regional interests did

not focus on the Middle East alone. He also looked southward toward a changing "tropical Africa."

Haile Selassie saw himself as a model for aspiring African leaders just beginning to push off their colonial overlords and many viewed him—as they had Menelik before him—as a symbol of Black independence. The United States was not so sure. Ethiopia, Richards pointed out in his country report, was not as stable as Haile Selassie made it out to be and his government not as benign. "The predominant prominent personal role played by the Emperor is a source of weakness as well as strength," Richards commented. "He is now 64 years old and it is by no means certain that his succession will be peaceful." Even talking about succession, however, highlighted the question of how very undemocratic was the nation's political system. Though the emperor could be justly congratulated for pursuing development, it was always implemented on his own terms. "Thus far the political passivity of a backward population has enabled the Ethiopian Government to rule the country with inadequate recognition of basic human rights and with little apparent concern for the needs of its people as judged from an occidental standpoint," Richards noted.⁵⁹ One wonders if Haile Selassie had yet recognized that the wave of decolonization that was about to sweep over Africa meant that the United States was going to be distributing aid to dozens more nations. Independence from Europe could not be allowed to mean the freedom to align with the USSR.

On March 6, 1957, the British retreated from Ghana, initiating the beginning of the end of the colonial era. Vice President Richard Nixon flew in to Accra to enjoy the celebration, infamously embarrassing himself by enthusiastically asking a man next to him how it felt to be free, only to hear, "I wouldn't know, sir, I'm from Alabama." The incident addressed America's difficulty of trying to capture the loyalties of nonwhite leaders abroad while denying equality to nonwhite citizens at home.⁶⁰ Institutionalized racism within the United States did not go unnoticed by rising African leaders such as Ghana's new president Kwame Nkrumah, and it did not hold up favorably in comparison to racially tolerant Soviet system, which made other aspects of that system more appealing. Nkrumah, who became known as "the father of African socialism," was vocal from the start about capitalism's limited ability to bring rapid economic progress *and* social justice to Ghana. Capitalism seemed too closely tied to imperialism to be an acceptable choice.⁶¹ The potential attractiveness of Ghana's initial political/economic structure to other African states on the verge of independence made Washington policymakers even more determined to prop up loyal African allies wherever they could be found—including Ethiopia.⁶²



FIGURE 5.2 An American nurse registers future students at the Itegue Menen School of Nursing in Asmara, Eritrea, in February 1955. On the wall above hangs a framed image of Haile Selassie with the Eisenhowers during his 1954 visit to the United States. *Still Picture Records Section, National Archives, College Park, Maryland*

When Nixon left Accra, he flew to Addis Abba, where he met with Foreign Minister Aklilu Habte Wolde on March 12, who began their conversation by saying that "he wished first of all to emphasize the growing importance of Africa." Ethiopia welcomed the birth of new self-governing states, Aklilu told him, and lent its support. "He spoke of Ethiopia as being both a Middle Eastern and African nation, which it enhances its importance to the United States," Nixon reported, and emphasized its years of loyalty. An IEG statement, "Defense Problems of Ethiopia," repeated the message to the vice president with greater vehemence, noting that although Ethiopia "is playing the stooge of the Colonel Powers, in sending her sons to die in Korea and in being the stalking horse for the imperialist designs of those same Powers on freedom of national development," the United States "has never intended seriously to support Ethiopia's defense efforts." The paper went on, not unpredictably, to list all of the military equipment that the IEG believed the United States needed to supply. The emperor continued the attack, albeit with his classic dignity and restraint, emphasizing to Nixon "the need for a

re-examination of relations" between the two nations.⁶³ The IEG's combined efforts worked, for Nixon wrote to the secretary of defense a few days after his return, "I believe that Ethiopia will have an increasingly important influence in African affairs, and that our enlightened self-interest requires that we ensure their continued friendship and support of our policies." In addition, he continued, getting to the heart of IEG frustrations, "I further believe that the Armed Forces of Ethiopia could have an important stabilizing role in the Middle East in addition to their primary mission of internal security."⁶⁴ Neither economic nor military assistance, Nixon insisted, would be wasted on Ethiopia. Eisenhower trumped him by insisting that it would not be wasted anywhere.

In February 1958, the president sent Congress a request for \$142 million for the ICA for FY 1959, along with an additional \$3.9 billion for the other components of the Mutual Security Program. Throughout the decade, his message read, the program had dramatically increased the military power of the free world and "afforded the critical margin of assistance" required by "newly developing" nations "to make the economic progress essential to their survival." Our programs show their more than one billion citizens that "growth can be achieved more readily in conditions of freedom, that it is not necessary to sacrifice liberty for bread." We cannot slowdown our efforts, Eisenhower continued, because in the past three years, the Soviet Union and Communist China "have been offering increasing amounts of economic and technical aid to countries of the free world, often under conditions that, on the surface, are appealing." Free countries would not willingly indebted themselves to Moscow, but if "forced to choose between abandoning development programs demanded by their people, or achieving them through Communist bloc assistance," they would pick the latter. We began providing assistance years before "the Soviet economic offensive began" and "so long as the uncommitted countries know that the rest of the free world shares their aspirations and is prepared to help them achieve economic and social progress in independence and freedom, we can be confident that the cause of the free world will prevail." Eisenhower punctuated his request for continued aid with a dramatic flourish, insisting, "For the safety of our families, the future of our children and our continued existence as a nation, we cannot afford to slacken our support of the mutual security program."⁶⁵

The next month, as Congress debated a new bill based on Eisenhower's request, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on the Mutual Security Act. Stuart H. Van Dyke, the regional director for Africa and Europe in the ICA, reported "until about a year ago, African programs were

limited to technical cooperation in Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, and a few projects in the British overseas territories," but we have plans to expand into Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Federation of Rhodesia. Our activities revolve around agriculture and education, and "we plan to continue in such fields as building extension systems; crop research, range management, and livestock improvement; development; conservation, and improved use of water supplies; reforestation; fisheries; and development of local institutions for agricultural education, credit, and various cooperative activities." Our "industry effort is still relatively small," he admitted, "because the opportunities for technical assistance in this field are limited at the present stage of development in most of Africa."⁶⁶

Van Dyke cited Ethiopia as an example of the program's success. The Agriculture and Technical School at Jimma, he reported, which had opened in 1952 with 80 students, had since graduated 121, and now had an enrollment of 215 "drawn from most of the provinces of Ethiopia." The Imperial Ethiopia College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, he continued, opened in 1956 and estimated a class size of more than three hundred students by 1961. Joint efforts with Oklahoma State University to improve coffee production had created the cultivation of a seed with a 90 percent survival rate, compared to the 30 to 40 percent survival rate of transplanted wild seedlings. Of these improved plants, 298,000 were sold in 1957, and demand continues to rise. In addition, the ICA had introduced a new "wet method" of processing that increased the value of the coffee as much as 25 percent per pound. Three hundred tons were processed that way in 1956 and 1,500 in 1957 as extension workers spread the technology throughout the countryside. Cognizant that illness hindered Ethiopia's national productivity, Point Four spent \$949,000 on public health projects between 1952 and 1957, with most of that going to the Gondar training program and the malaria control project that had started in 1956 in conjunction with the World Health Organization. As of 1958, the malaria project had provided protection for about eighty thousand people and made it possible to reclaim about eight hundred square miles of agricultural land previously too dangerous to farm. "Our objective," Van Dyke concluded, "is a stable, prosperous, friendly Africa," and continuing our aid programs will enable us to reach that goal. "The character and degree of United States support to Africa's economic development can mean the difference between an orderly evolution in keeping with democratic ideas and institutions, and violent and authoritarian movements that arise from poverty, disease, and despair."⁶⁷

The rhetoric was moving, but senators have to worry about elections and they had questions. "Are we creating a dependency economically," asked

Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin (who had complained about being Santa Claus to Acheson back in 1950) about Morocco in particular and all aid recipients in general, "or are we improving their own economy so that eventually they may be able to get along without our support?" Van Dyke insisted that the ICA was building an "economic base" that would hold self-sustaining economies. Wiley went on to ask how much of the Mutual Security Act money was spent on goods purchased in the United States and was a little disgruntled to learn that it was only as high as 75 percent. He was hoping for ninety. William F. Knowland of California asked about the difficulties surrounding Ethiopia's ability to absorb foreign capital, and Van Dyke responded with a brief explanation of the complications of establishing land ownership throughout the country. The ICA is training people about the benefits of "modern practices," he continued, but it is "going to be a long and difficult process." No one questioned whether or not it was beneficial, they just wondered how long it would take to do so. On that front, Van Dyke stressed the positives: "They can of course leapfrog all the difficulties we faced in developing the legal and procedural institutions which make our modern economy operate." What had worked in the United States presumably worked everywhere. There was one path to progress and American aid funds made sure that more nations could follow it. Heaven help us, Van Dyke gloomily implied, if we fail to do so.⁶⁸

International leaders wisely used the fear to their own advantage. When Washington did not respond quickly enough to his request for a larger amount of assistance, Haile Selassie went on a highly publicized trip to the Soviet Union, which resulted in more than \$100 million of economic credits. The United States knew about the trip beforehand and worried about its potential ramifications. Discussing the situation at a 1959 NSC meeting, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles warned that the move might be "the first major attempt of the Communist Bloc to penetrate into the deeper parts of Africa." It might also be possible that the emperor is, "in a quiet way, attempting to blackmail the U.S. Some opposition to his agreements has already made itself apparent in Addis Ababa," he continued, "but the opposition groups, who have approached us with the idea of putting the Crown Prince on the throne, have very little popular backing." We are, Dulles gravely noted, following the situation carefully.⁶⁹ "In subsequent months, not entirely coincidentally, U.S. assistance increased very substantially," noted a confidential State Department report. We do not "plan to outbid the Soviets," Deputy Director John Rort announced in a secret January 1960 meeting, but we will move "to block Soviet dominance over key sectors." Between 1959 and 1962, Ethiopia received \$66 million in technical, economic and military

assistance from the United States. It was less than the Soviets had promised, but it was enough to keep the emperor friendly. Haile Selassie promptly sent troops to the Congo to assist U.S. troops in a public gesture of support. He had always been adept at international politics.⁷⁰

On returning to Ethiopia after his 1959 world tour—which included stops in Egypt, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, France, Portugal, West Germany, and Yugoslavia—Haile Selassie explained his main objective had been, as it always was, "to find ways and means of raising the standard of living of Our people and the economic development of Our country." He went in search of aid to finance Ethiopia's five year plan, the final result of the National Economic Council he had created back in 1954. He had formally presented the plan to the people in 1957, promising that its implementation would pull Ethiopia "out of economic backwardness and strengthen its economy and its position in international relations." A constant lack of funds, however, had slowed its implementation. This was particularly vexing considering that its most basic aim was to "accelerate development by a coordinated and actively pursued development policy in the immediate future," thereby laying "the foundation "for more intensive and overall development" in the future. The words employed in the introduction—acceleration, immediacy, coordination, intensity, and activity—betrayed the committee's, or, perhaps most correctly, Haile Selassie's, insistence on big change. Defying Point Four workers' attempts to end Ethiopia's underdevelopment through many small, grassroots projects, the IEG's plan called for a large-scale, centralized approach that attacked numerous development issues all at once. If implemented, the plan's authors promised, Ethiopia could potentially reach an annual increase in the national income of 3.7 percent, compared to current rates of 2 to 2.5 percent.⁷¹

Haile Selassie's Five Year Plan revolved around the construction of an "urban economy" as the most efficient means of ending peasant agriculture's stranglehold on the national market. He viewed Ethiopia's massive peasant class, representing about 90 percent of the population, as the premier impediment to modernization. "The great problem of future economic development," the IEG insisted, "is to find ways and means of transforming a subsistence economy into a monetary one. The development of industry, handicrafts, commerce and transport is a way of creating a monetary economy, of changing the social and economic structure, and of increasing income per head."⁷² He wanted to turn a nation of farmers and pastoralists into a nation of merchants and industrialists. He wanted to move Ethiopia into the later stages of the Scottish Enlightenment's age of commerce, and he wanted to do it quickly.

He began with his largest resource: the people. All of those laborers in the field should be moved into factories. Investing most of the money allocated for the Five Year Plan into the transportation, communication, electrical, and manufacturing sectors, would, Haile Selassie believed, make that move a reality. According to the plan, these sectors would end up with 340.4 of the 534.6 million Ethiopian dollars budgeted for monetary investment by the government between 1957 and 1961. Meanwhile, agriculture, which employed the vast majority of the population, received only \$40.3 million, and much of that was directed toward establishing large commercialized farms to produce crops such as coffee and cotton for export. The IEG insisted that industry would replace agriculture as the center of the economy, for as the factories were built, people would move from rural to urban areas. There consequently seemed little incentive to try to modernize individual farms and plans to create a national agricultural extension service had a budget of only \$5 million for four years.⁷³ Haile Selassie did not want a nation of farmers; he wanted a nation of industrialists. That put him at odds with the United States, which wanted Ethiopia to be the breadbasket of the Middle East. Breadbaskets, however, as everyone involved well knew, cannot permanently sustain the massive economic growth required to earn a nation the adjective "wealthy." Haile Selassie was no one's fool and he did not intend to place any limitations on his nation's future progress, at least its future *economic* progress. Its *political* progress was another question entirely, but then, no one seemed particularly worried about that anyway.

Haile Selassie spoke the language of economic growth theory fluently. "The present high standard of development has been achieved through the accumulation of knowledge from time immemorial," he announced in a 1959 speech. "We would like Our people to realize that this is not something that has been accomplished at one stage nor by coincidence, nor has this stage been reached in one generation, but is the result of the toil, fortitude and sacrifice of succeeding generations." Although others are ahead of us now, he continued, we have "awakened" and are embarking down "the road to progress." Wanting will get us there. If all Ethiopians will "generate an unceasing desire for better and more things" and "eradicate idleness," then they "shall elevate their standard of living to that of the people inhabiting other parts of the world and be able to spare for others." Those nations that have "attained a high degree of progress" have done so by virtue of their "achievements," he insisted, "not because of the difference in their innate ability." We are behind only because we have not yet unfolded our potential. It starts with thrift, for although you must want unceasingly you have to want something more than

immediate pleasures. "Use your savings where it will pay you the most. The hoarding of money does not yield dividends!" Invest your money; turn cash into capital. If you do not have savings, then work to get some. If you farm, then plant commercial crops. If you have forests, then "make furniture and implements and exchange them for money."⁷⁴ His instructions revealed his familiarity with the intricacies of Anglo-American economics. Like the participants of the Scottish Enlightenment, Haile Selassie conceptualized progress as a movement through stages and described wanting to be the central engine of change. Like the early twentieth-century economists, he rejected nineteenth-century racial hierarchies of ability and embraced the principles of savings-into-growth and entrepreneurship-into-development. The emperor relied on the Western example of development for a great deal, but not for everything. Ethiopia's long history of achievement, he argued, warranted respect and some aspects of its glorious past had to be retained. The list included imperial authority.

Haile Selassie concluded his speech with specific instructions: "Henceforth, the next step for each Ethiopian, wherever he may be and whatever his endeavors are, is to follow Our directions and to devote himself assiduously to the execution of Our plan for the betterment of Our country."⁷⁵ The use of the royal "Our" emphasized the point that economic development demanded political obedience. The vast majority of the nation's development funds went into communication, transportation and industry, which were exactly the sectors best suited to increasing the IEG's influence. Haile Selassie had never been willing to separate modernization from centralization and integration and he was not about to start now.⁷⁶ Although he relied heavily on two-hundred years of conversations about the causes and consequences of economic growth, he forged his own path down "the road of progress."

The emperor desperately desired the economic development of his nation, but his motivations were complex. On the one hand, he simply wanted to improve the daily lot of his people, which was currently pretty dismal. He wanted them to have the same kinds of opportunities as the people he visited with on his trips abroad. At the same time, however, he rejected out of hand the idea of moving power away from the throne, renouncing the authority of the people that defined modern political development. It is worth remembering once again that he titled his autobiography, *My Life and Ethiopia's Progress*. For him, the two things could not be separated. He firmly believed that he had the *right* to rule, and he could justify God's choice to the outside world by making his nation strong.

Even in modernization, Haile Selassie followed in the footsteps of former emperors, using new tools to pursue old dreams of imperial consolidation. He wanted what his predecessors had wanted, and he was better situated to get it.⁷⁷ The Ethiopian philosopher Messay Kebede wrote of the emperor, "Modernization was for him nothing else but the use of modern means to assert his complete power over the nobility." Because he was ultimately more concerned with security than with development, Messay insisted, it was little wonder his development programs proved to have limited economic significance for Ethiopia: "Because modern means were used for a purpose which was not modern, they were unable to inaugurate any sustained and consistent process of modernization."⁷⁸ Haile Selassie shied away from meaningful reforms while enacting numerous development "programs." This proved particularly the case with the entrenched feudalesque system and the government's stubborn resistance to substantial land reform throughout the 1950s, which effectively kept provincial authority in crown-loyal hands and allowed peasant dependence to continue. The first Point Four technicians to Ethiopia had argued that reforming peasant agriculture had to serve as the foundation of any meaningful development program, but Haile Selassie consistently dedicated his limited development budget to infrastructural, industrial, and *commercial* agricultural projects. The IEG implemented over half of the infrastructural and industrial projects in Addis Ababa and put the rest in Asmara and Dire Dawa, which biased the north and the center. The same was true of the emphasis on coffee, which was predominately grown in the south on northern-owned estates. His Imperial Majesty wanted development-into-personal power along with development-into-wealth and he knew that technology was the key to securing both.⁷⁹

Haile Selassie shared with Point Four administrators a common understanding of development as an economic process built on capital formation via technological progress. He differed from them in his effort to implement large-scale technological development from the top down as opposed to small-scale from the ground up. Some of the difference in methodology between the Point Four mission and the IEG's mission can be explained as a difference of funding and manpower, but a good deal of it can only be understood as a difference in politics. The U.S. Point Four Mission to Ethiopia was essentially a goodwill mission from one country, looking to maintain allies by providing a "valuable" service, to another, looking for funds and happy to have the service. From Washington's perspective, particularly by the mid-1950s when it seemed clear that creating "development" was trickier than originally thought, developing Ethiopia was viewed as more "useful" than "essential." Haile Selassie,

however, believed it to be critical for the survival of both himself and his nation. That explains why he placed so much emphasis on military assistance and why he chose to create a highly publicized Five Year Development Plan. Although he did not believe that he should have to justify his continued rule, there were enough grumblings to convince him that it would be wise to do so. In addition, choosing the "five year" model followed the U.N.'s 1951 suggestion and certainly would not hurt relations with the Soviets (as, indeed, it did not, considering his fruitful 1959 visit). The emperor was no communist, but he was no republican either. He embraced the West's parliamentary system with its rule of law, but neutered it with constitutional guarantees of his own dictatorship. He greatly desired America's friendship and respect, but he was happy to accept Soviet money. He had bigger things to worry about than their cold war.

"Of the countries which We visited during Our recent trip, there are some whose economic and political systems are different from Ours. We believe that these are made to serve the particular needs of each country and are matters of domestic concern to each nation," Haile Selassie announced in his 1959 return speech. As such, they should not "stand as a hindrance to the understanding, collaboration and co-operation among nations on important matters that are of common concern."⁸⁰ Washington and Moscow fervently disagreed. Haile Selassie wanted to move his nation out of the "Third World" into the "First World," but he did not shun relations with the "Second World," because the stages for him were about wealth, not ideology. He embraced large-scale industrial development projects because the economic literature supported them as critical to growth, even though American technicians did not. Point Four tried to develop underdeveloped nations with relatively little money—particularly in comparison with the Marshall Plan—and its projects were correspondingly limited.

As the 1950s progressed and most underdeveloped nations did not, conversations about foreign aid became increasingly more complicated. Fears that the development model was not working were coupled with concern about how far aid dollars could be stretched as newly independent countries filed into the United Nations and onto the American aid payroll. Growing Soviet involvement kept Washington's pocketbook open, but had the troublesome effect of pushing military aid ahead of technical and economic assistance. Thinly spreading a limited foreign aid budget meant that no country got as much as it wanted, and, from the perspective of development, as much as it needed. From the beginning, the Truman administration sold Point Four as a program that would eventually make itself obsolete by pushing

underdeveloped nations into the global market where the wonders of capitalism could work their economic magic. By the late 1950s, however, the reality was that nations such as Ethiopia—plagued by the ills of poverty, dictatorial government, and a national market dedicated almost entirely to one product—went looking for money anywhere they could get it because American programs were too limited in their vision and their funding.

In December 1958, Jahangir Amuzegar, of Occidental College in Los Angeles, and future Iranian finance minister, published an insightful analysis entitled "Point Four: Performance and Prospect." Though still popular with many people, the program had lost much of its initial support, following criticism on political, economic, and administrative grounds, most publicly in the congressional hearings. "Politically," Amuzegar reported, "the program has been accused of supporting undemocratic and nonprogressive governments. Economically, it has been criticized for hasty planning, poor selection of projects, and inadequate coordination amongst assistance activities. Administratively, it has been charged with inefficiency, waste and irregularities." These problems, Amuzegar insisted, were products of the program's "conflicting objectives" and its limited funding.



FIGURE 5.3 Douglas Baker, an ICA technician, discusses cattle inoculations with students at the Jimma Agricultural Technical School in May 1957. Lessons were often filmed so that they could be shown to people who were unable to attend the school. *Still Picture Records Section, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.*

Point Four was initially designed to prevent communism from spreading, bolster the international market and "demonstrate" America's "philanthropic generosity," but "the realities of the mid-twentieth century politics, economics and ethics showed that these assumptions were largely aspirationally conditioned and somewhat unrealistic."⁸¹ The United States essentially wanted Point Four to solve all of its problems in the underdeveloped world, but the program could not do so for a variety of reasons. Not only were the goals unrealistic, Amuzegar continued, but they were often in contention with the plans of the countries receiving Point Four assistance.

A belief in the value of jointly run programs, as seen in the wording of every technical agreement, remained at the center of the Point Four idea. Although this structure had been designed to foster greater unity between countries, it unfortunately also enhanced the problem of Point Four's "conflicting objectives," for the program had to absorb not only domestic differences of opinion, but international ones as well. Conflicts over what the program should be doing raged in Washington and in every country that had a U.S. technical assistance mission. Amuzegar believed that this situation created competing hierarchies, pitting U.S. strategic interests against the "social and economic interests" of the underdeveloped nation. The first hierarchy demanded that Point Four achieve two basic objectives: "(1) to serve as part of a *political* program designed to convince the people in the uncommitted areas that their interests lay in siding with the West; and (2) indirectly to assist a *military* program designed to strengthen the defense of the areas against the threat of Communist aggression or internal subversion." Meanwhile, the second "demanded that the program (1) pay greater heed to improving *social* and *economic* conditions, and (2) meet these objectives through the least possible interference with the existing political and social orders." As it was always difficult and often impossible simultaneously to satisfy both, "the Point Four program faced some serious and almost insoluble political, economic and administrative paradoxes."⁸² In trying to be all things to all people, the program soon became overextended and failed to fulfill almost any of its objectives successfully.

Something, it seemed clear, needed to be done. Point Four's problems, Amuzegar insisted, should not lead to its destruction, but to its reform. Recent history has taught us, he argued, that Point Four should be "divorced from political and strategic programs" and moved out of the State Department into a separate, independent agency, responsible to Congress and dedicated to foreign assistance alone.⁸³ The idea was to turn Point Four back into the pure "instrument" of development that it had been imagined to be in

1949, before the Korean War broke out, changed the rules of the Cold War, and made technical assistance for development seem too small a project behind which to rally a fearful nation. An important part of its identity had gotten lost within the Mutual Security Act and needed to be recovered. People at the ICA agreed.

Dennis A. Fitzgerald, an agricultural economist from Harvard and director of the ICA from 1953 (when it was still the Foreign Operations Administration) to 1961, shared some of his former frustrations in a 1976 interview. "The State Department, and I think this is particularly true of Dulles, looked upon the AID agency—maybe this is unfair but certainly we felt this way—as just a convenient device by which you avoided the whole responsibility for anything that went wrong. But simultaneously you ordered it to do what the State Department wanted." Fitzgerald gave an example:

Dulles went to Ethiopia once. He told Haile Selassie or somebody—(we had what was considered a highly important communications center somewhere in the country) that the U.S. would give him nine million dollars worth of aid as a quid pro quo. We didn't learn about it for a couple of months. We'd get communications from our embassy over there asking "Where's this nine million dollars we promised Haile Selassie?" We replied, "What nine million dollars?" It was a hell of a mess. Haile Selassie thought he was going to get a check the next day. I'm exaggerating, but not too much. We finally developed a program which had a price tag on it of the amount that Dulles had promised the Ethiopians, but it had no real underpinning and had a negligible effect on that country's development.⁸⁴

The State Department viewed the ICA as a tool of foreign policy, whereas the ICA viewed itself as a tool of development. For the former, the satisfaction of the leaders of the client country was more important than the performance of the projects themselves, so there was pressure on the ICA to do whatever it could with its limited budget to secure loyalty. This caused a conflict of interest as ICA technicians wanted to work on grassroots agriculture, education, and public health projects, and foreign governments tended to want large-scale industrial projects, or, even better, checks for nine million dollars. "What they wanted and what they needed were very frequently entirely different," he recalled. "Instant modernization, I think was a kind of delusion. You just can't, there is no such thing as instant modernization."⁸⁵

Under Fitzgerald's direction, Point Four continued to favor the same types of

programs throughout the Eisenhower administration that it had under the Truman administration. "Consideration must be given to just where the particular country is presently located on the long and unending road to development," he announced in a 1959 speech. "For instance, there is little point in giving high level advice on animal genetics to a country that has not yet accepted the idea that feed is good for livestock."⁸⁶ Progress comes one step at a time. His fellow economists tended to agree.

The debate in Washington over the purposes of foreign aid corresponded with discussions within the field of economics over economic growth, now central to the discipline, and developmental economics, a struggling outlier within the field. As always, the vast majority of economists concerned themselves with the issues facing the countries where most of them had been born and most of them worked. Booming growth in the United States and Western Europe during the 1950s made them optimistic for the first time in decades. Such confidence affected even those working on the "newly developing" nations, whose subjects did not perform nearly as well. Few fell into despair over aid's previous performance. It was simply a question of figuring out the proper formula. Policymakers at home, pleased by flourishing domestic economies, continued to turn to them for answers. Economists entered the second half of the twentieth century vastly more powerful than they had been during the first. They used their success to structure their discipline in ways that increasingly distanced it from the average person, thereby better insulating it from criticism and ensuring its mystique. *Economies* needed to be ruled by economists.

The man most responsible for the shift was a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) named Paul Samuelson who insisted in a 1947 work that economists start writing, once again, in mathematics. He directly attacked Alfred Marshall's efforts to use biological and mechanical analogies instead of mathematical formulas, which the older economist believed could not adequately express the complexities of economic behavior. Samuelson disagreed, insisting that the language of mathematics would take economics farther than prose ever could. His ideas became doctrine with the 1948 publication of *Economics: An Introductory Analysis*, which became the best-selling economic textbook of all time and the standard text of every undergraduate macroeconomics course. Unlike John Stuart Mill and Marshall, who "had dealt with essentially pure capitalism," Samuelson later recalled, "I had to grapple with the tradeoffs and opportunities inherent in the mixed economy." His was a decidedly post-Keynesian book that sold particular economic theories as truths and largely ignored voices of protest, most notably

Freidrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. Samuelson reflected the popular trend within the discipline that accepted the virtues of laissez-faire in terms of free trade, but favored heavy government involvement toward stabilization within the national economy. He called it "neoclassical" for its blending of Keynesian macroeconomics with the older marginal utility school's micro-economic emphasis on rational choice. The popularity of his work ensured that mainstream economics would, for the time being, be written in mathematics and theorized within the post-Keynesian paradigm. This trend within the discipline had ramifications throughout the political realm, of which Samuelson was well aware. "I don't care who writes a nation's laws—or crafts its advanced treaties," he later famously commented, "if I can write its economics textbooks."⁸⁷

Samuelson's influence was most immediately apparent in what came to be called neoclassical growth theory—a 1950s spin on Harrod and Domar's 1940s model. As Harrod had "dynamized" Keynes, the new theory essentially "stabilized" the Harrod-Domar model, which revolved around a delicate, and therefore precarious, balance between the national savings rate (s), the product of the capital-output ratio (v), and the rate of growth of the labor force (n). The Harrod-Domar model argued that the savings rate had to equal the other two ($s = vn$ in the new language of choice) in order to secure steady growth. The problem with this, MIT economist Robert Solow wrote in a highly influential 1956 article, is that "were the magnitudes of the key parameters . . . to slip ever so slightly from dead center, the consequence would be either growing unemployment or prolonged inflation." In the optimistic atmosphere of the 1950s, Solow refused to accept this doctrine of "fixed proportions" and mathematically argued instead for a more flexible model that took technology into account. Technology could increase the productivity of capital, which would increase savings, which would increase investment and inspire long-term growth. The policy ramifications were that it "leaves a nation *some* leeway to choose whether it wants high employment with relatively high capital formation, low consumption, rapid growth; or the reverse; or some mixture." Solow's model did not challenge the idea of investment into growth; it just moved the previous model off "the knife-edge" by recognizing that exogenous technological change offered hope to nations worried about securing the perfect balance believed necessary for economic growth.⁸⁸

Although Solow's model had clear implications for development, he was not a developmental economist and his work, like that of Harrod and Domar before him, reflected a preoccupation with securing growth in developed economies. His emphasis on technology transformed the field, but he himself

admitted that his work was highly theoretical. In contrast, a number of economists working specifically with underdeveloped economies emphasized practice above theory, insisting that these economies were so different from developed ones that they demanded that economists reconsider what they "knew" about economic growth. Their work moved along different lines—including new ideas about the relationships among labor, capital, and investment; fresh analysis of national income statistics; and a revitalized appreciation for the value of economic history to economic doctrine. More democratic in their focus, developmental economists were also more democratic in their writing, preferring prose to mathematical formulas.

Developmental economists shared a focus on underdeveloped nations' potential for growth and a sense that economic growth defined development. They still looked at gross domestic product, and they still talked about balancing labor, capital, and investment, but they refused to stop there. In a 1953 lecture in Brazil, Princeton economist Jacob Viner argued that the realization of an underdeveloped nation's potential has to begin with investments in human capital. The "masses" need to be "literate, healthy, and sufficiently well fed to be strong and energetic" in order to enhance their productivity.⁸⁹ W. Arthur Lewis of the University of Manchester wrote that Keynesian arguments about growth based on a limited labor supply were completely unsuited to underdeveloped economies with large populations of workers employed in sustainable agriculture. "In the neoclassical model," he wrote in a famous 1954 article, "capital can only be created by withdrawing resources from producing consumer goods," but underdeveloped nations have surplus labor, which he described as labor involved in low-productive activities. The work of the classical economists, he insisted, was much more applicable in such situations than that of the Keynesians, because Smith and Malthus wrote about nations full of people engaged in subsistence agriculture. The discourse, Viner and Lewis insisted, needed to return to the question of agricultural productivity, which was no longer a concern of developed nations.⁹⁰

Lewis's emphasis on a return to older economic ideas revealed developmental economists' tendency to place underdevelopment within an historical perspective. The idea that poorer nations simply had "younger" economies that would eventually grow into "older," wealthier ones was publically accepted. "What France, Britain, and America have accomplished through their own revolutions has to be attained in backward countries by a combined effort of popular forces, enlightened government, and unselfish foreign help," Stanford economist Paul Baran insisted, using words decidedly similar to those the Truman administration used to sell Point Four.⁹¹ Simon Kuzners

made the point more scientifically with his incredible compilations of international income statistics. The tables led him to a more complicated picture of economic growth. "The presently developed countries," he wrote in 1956, "were already in advance of the 'rest of the world' when modern industrialization began." In contrast, the currently underdeveloped nations "face the prospect of industrialization from a position of inferiority in that their per capita incomes lag substantially behind those of the advanced sector of the world's economy today," which makes their situation unique. "The intellectual, political, and geographic revolutions which occurred between the 13th and 16th centuries were important and indispensable antecedents to the economic expansion that followed," he argued. Today's underdeveloped nations "were outside the orbit of these revolutions and of the growth that preceded the economic and technological changes which began in the late 18th and continued through the following centuries." They were not underdeveloped because they had missed the Industrial Revolution; they were underdeveloped because they had missed the conditions that made that revolution possible. The politics came before the science that came before the technology that came before the economic growth.⁹²

Kuznet's work stressed the historic particularities behind the West's progress and purposely complicated the applicability of the neoclassical growth model by insisting that growth was not simply a question of savings and investments, but of historical circumstances. The growth theorists had created their models for nations whose development was already established, so it was hardly their fault that the models did not work everywhere. For economists primarily interested in theory, questions of applicability were of little interest. For economists dedicated to manipulating economic change in the fight against poverty, applicability mattered a great deal. One such economist was Bert Hoselitz of the University of Chicago, who lamented that "the theoretical treatment of economic growth is either too strongly policy-oriented, or it is stated in an overly general form whose results are applicable only with difficulty, and often with grave reservations, to actual cases of economic growth." Critical of growth theory models that ignored historical and social conditions, Hoselitz insisted on bringing noneconomic variables into the discussion. There "is not a single, uniform theory of growth," he wrote in 1955, "but rather an array of typical situations conducive to growth."⁹³

His ideas complemented those of a young economist at MIT. In 1952, W. W. Rostow wrote *The Process of Economic Growth*, "an historian's book about economic theory," in order to assist graduate students in his seminar on "the pattern of the evolution of the world economy since the mid-eighteenth

century." It contained some charts and tables, but no formulas and was therefore open to anyone who was interested, as opposed to anyone who had undergone the proper professional training. Indeed, the book criticized the limitations of that training. Modern economic thought, Rostow wrote, developed "within Marshallian short-period assumptions; that is, the social and political framework of the economy, the state of the arts, and the levels of fixed capacity are assumed to be given and, usually, fixed." These work for most economists, who are trying to create theories, but "are intolerable assumptions for the historian" who "must take as unique events, in their full complexity, the situations he confronts." The historian cannot study events in isolation, as can the economist. The historian cannot embrace the concept of rational choice, because he knows that humans are far too complex to assume that they will act a certain way in a certain situation. Bridging the gap between economics, politics, and history, Rostow argued that "an appropriate scientific framework for the making of public policy . . . requires the development of improved tools for the handling of long-period factors and for relating social and political forces to the body of economics." In other words, economists needed to start thinking like historians, leaving behind the comfort of idealized theories of specific behavior in specific situations in order to study the unique realities of economies in action.⁹⁴

"In entering this complex terrain, where variables long firmly nailed down are set in motion," Rostow wrote, "economists may take a certain comfort," for we are simply returning to our roots. Adam Smith "used history not simply to illustrate static relationships but to illuminate the processes by which the wealth of nations may increase or decrease." Smith looked at short-term fluctuations and long-term trends. "He was concerned not only with the relation of public policy to the rate of economic development, but also with what we would call social policy and social attitudes." He saw public education as a key determinant of national wealth. "It is not a distortion of *The Wealth of Nations*," Rostow asserted, "to regard it as a dynamic analysis of the forces determining change in long-period factors, placed in a setting of the social and political forces relevant to economic development." That way of thinking did not end with Smith, but continued on, notably with Malthus, Mill, and Marshall (although economists often ignore the latter's interest in long-period factors). Anyone truly interested in understanding economic growth, Rostow concluded, must combine the methods of the classical economists with the concepts of the professionalized social sciences. He or she must be willing "to bring to bear on this problem the accumulated knowledge and methods of the non-economic social scientists"—not simply because the

quest for answers demands it, but because Marx already did it and hundreds of millions of people around the world are being taught his interpretation of economic growth. "I have," Rostow confessed, "by no means solved the problem of formulating an alternative to the Marxist system," but this is a beginning.⁹⁵

Four years later, Rostow published a theory of economic growth based on the histories of world's many industrial revolutions. That history, he argued, reveals that the "sequence of economic development" can be broken down into three periods: "a long period (up to a century or, conceivably, more) when the preconditions for take-off are established; the take-off itself, defined within two or three decades; and a long period when growth becomes normal and relatively automatic." For the "take-off" to begin, he wrote, it is necessary "that the proportion of net investment to national income . . . rises from (say) 5% to over 10%, definitely outstripping the likely population pressure," but that, by itself, is not enough. A nation also needs "the development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors with a high rate of growth" and "the existence or quick emergence of a political, social, and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external economy effects of the take-off." Growth, it seemed clear, depends upon a variety of conditions. It requires the movement of money from those who hoard to those who spend (as Adam Smith argued), "the existence and successful activity" of risk-taking entrepreneurs (as Schumpeter argued), and a complex economy with primary and secondary growth sectors to absorb investments (as Rosenstein-Rodan argued)—all of which depend upon a variety of historic political, social, and cultural factors. Man does not progress by savings and investments alone.⁹⁶

In 1960, Rostow published *The Stages of the Economic Growth*, turning his 1956 article into "A Non-Communist Manifesto," and expanding his explanation of development. He now placed societies within five categories: "the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption." The United States, Western Europe, and Japan were now in the "the age of high mass-consumption," he explained, and the rest of the world longed to catch up. Doing so required adopting the conditions necessary for "maturity": (1) a shift from a reliance on agriculture "to a predominance for industry, communications, trade and services"; (2) a shift from grassroots focus to one on a national and an international level; (3) a rejection of large family traditions; (4) a readjustment of capital out of the hands of landed aristocracy and into the hands of capitalists; (5) a willingness to value individuals not for who they are but for what they can do; (6) "and, above all, the concept must be spread that man need

not regard his physical environment as virtually a factor given by nature and providence, but as an ordered world which, if rationally understood, can be manipulated in ways which yield productive change and, in one dimension at least, progress."⁹⁷ Development was no longer an economic exercise, but a social passage, and foreign aid for development was going to have to change.

In 1956, Senator John F. Kennedy told attendees of the Conference on Vietnam Luncheon that what "we must offer them is a revolution—a political, economic and social revolution far superior to anything the Communists can offer." It was a decidedly Rostowesque vision. "We must supply capital to replace that drained by the centuries of colonial exploitation; technicians to train those handicapped by deliberate policies of illiteracy; guidance to assist a nation taking those first feeble steps toward the complexities of a republican form of government," Kennedy continued. "All this and more we can offer Free Vietnam, as it passes through the present period of transition on its way to a new era—an era of pride and independence, and an era of democratic and economic growth—an era which, when contrasted with the long years of colonial oppression, will truly represent a political, social and economic revolution."⁹⁸ When he moved into the White House in January 1961, he brought Rostow with him.⁹⁹ The world waited to see how the ideas would play out in the policies.

Seven thousand miles away, in a marble palace eight-thousand feet above sea level, a diminutive Ethiopian in a military uniform watched the shift with apprehension. 1960 had been a very troublesome year. Britain withdrew from British Somaliland on June 26 and that territory united with Italian Somaliland, which had been under U.N. control, to create the independent Somali Republic. He had more than 350,000 ethnic Somalis living permanently within his borders and several hundred thousand more who annually migrated in and out with their cattle. Many of them believed that one-fourth of his empire belonged to Somalia. He would have to act forcefully to maintain control. It seemed likely that Nasser's United Arab Republic would try to exploit the tensions under the guise of Muslim friendship. Less certain was how the presence of a new, independent nation would affect the Horn of Africa's place in the Cold War divide. Luckily, the French continued to hold on to French Somaliland, so the railway from Addis Ababa to Djibouti remained secure for now.¹⁰⁰

The other critical event of the year was almost too terrible to remember. Brigadier-General Mengestu Neway (commander of the bodyguard) and his brother Garmane (an employee of the Department of the Interior) had declared "The People's Government of Ethiopia" on December 14. It was

clearly Garmane's doing. He took advantage of the state's generosity by attending Haile Selassie I Secondary School and then, under the sponsorship of the Crown Prince, earned a B.A. at the University of Wisconsin and an M.A. at Columbia. He returned full of ideas about modernization and applied for a post to work in the provinces. Possessed by an unnatural desire to make Ethiopia mimic the new policies of its African neighbors, he began giving government land away to peasants. He was promptly sent down to work with the Somalis in Jijiga, where it was believed he would be less trouble. Desirous of power, Garmane convinced his brother to use the military to force change at the top. The emperor's visit to South America determined the date. He had flown home immediately, concerned for his family and his throne, but need not have worried—most of the army and all of the air force had stood by him, though their loyalty had disappointingly followed a promise of the first salary increase in decades. The Americans, after a brief and rather unsettling hesitation, had publically declared their support as well. Mengestu was promptly captured, tried, and hanged, along with the other key traitors. Those university students who had demonstrated with bedsheet banners announcing a bloodless revolution and a belligerent manifesto about their "ever present ambition to develop *our* dear country, to civilize *our* country and to lead *our* dear country towards a prosperous future" were not punished but would be watched more closely in the future. Most said that they joined out of fear rather than hope. How could it be otherwise after all that he had done for them? The same was true of the Crown Prince. He claimed he gave that disgraceful radio broadcast admitting that the government "of the favored few" was manipulating the law "to deprive the common people of their rights and privileges in order to build up riches" under mortal threat. Perhaps he was lying. The prince must also be watched. Haile Selassie felt tired. It had been a difficult year and he worried about the new decade.¹⁰¹

6

THE DEVELOPMENT DECADE

On September 12, 1974, soldiers entered the palace on the hill in Addis Ababa, bundled up the old, partially senile emperor, and drove off with him, rather incongruously, in a Volkswagen beetle. Haile Selassie's reign was over. In the weeks immediately following, famed Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuściński traveled to Addis Ababa to interview members of the palace household and governmental staff. The city was dangerous—seething with conspiracies—and talking could get you killed. All of the interviews were conducted in secret; names were reduced to initials in order to protect the witnesses to the final years of Ethiopia's aristocracy. P.M. was one of these shadowy figures willing to speak with the outsider. The foreign journalist and the Ethiopian both had reason to fear lights and open windows. Throughout, while listening to each other, they each also listened to the angry city on the other side of the wall.

From the intensity of the interview's opening, it seems as if Kapuściński waited to turn on his tape recorder until he knew that P.M. was going to give him the "good stuff." Perhaps he sat in a darkened room through long explanations of ceremonial processes and the emperor's eating habits before he finally prodded P.M. into an emotional fervor by asking him how the emperor had lost his power. Or, perhaps P.M. had simply been waiting for someone to listen to thoughts that had been turning around in his head for years, and he started the conversation exactly where he had always wanted it to begin: with development.

"A kind of mania seized this mad and unpredictable world, my friend: a mania for development," P.M. opened. "Everybody wanted to develop himself! Everyone thought about developing himself, and not simply according to God's law that man is born, develops, and dies. No," they wanted something more. "Each one wanted to develop himself extraordinarily, dynamically, and powerfully, to develop himself so that everyone would admire, envy, talk, and nod his head.